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Secure Massive MIMO Transmission in the
Presence of an Active Eavesdropper
Yongpeng Wu, Robert Schober, Derrick Wing Kwan Ng, Chengshan Xiao, and Giuseppe Caire
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate secure and reliable
transmission strategies for multi-cell multi-user massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) systems in the presence of an
active eavesdropper. We consider a time-division duplex system
where uplink training is required and an active eavesdropper
can attack the training phase to cause pilot contamination at
the transmitter. This forces the precoder used in the subsequent
downlink transmission phase to implicitly beamform towards
the eavesdropper, thus increasing its received signal power. We
derive an asymptotic achievable secrecy rate for matched filter
precoding and artificial noise (AN) generation at the transmitter
when the number of transmit antennas goes to infinity. For
the achievability scheme at hand, we obtain the optimal power
allocation policy for the transmit signal and the AN in closed
form. For the case of correlated fading channels, we show
that the impact of the active eavesdropper can be completely
removed if the transmit correlation matrices of the users and the
eavesdropper are orthogonal. Inspired by this result, we propose
a precoder null space design exploiting the low rank property
of the transmit correlation matrices of massive MIMO channels,
which can significantly degrade the eavesdropping capabilities of
the active eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security has attracted significant research
interest recently. In Wyner’s pioneering work on information-
theoretic security, a “wiretap channel” model was defined and
the associated secrecy capacity was obtained [1]. More recent
studies have investigated the capacity and the precoder design
for multiple antenna wiretap channels [2–4]. When the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is imperfectly
known at the transmitter, artificial noise (AN) can be generated
and transmitted along with the information-bearing signal to
interfere the decoding process of the eavesdropper [5].
Most studies on physical layer security assume that perfect
CSI of the legitimate channel is available at the transmitter
and do not consider the channel training phase in acquiring the
CSI. However, in time-division duplex (TDD) communication
systems, the base station (BS) needs to estimate the channel
for the subsequent downlink transmission based on the pilot
sequences sent by the users in the uplink training phase. As a
result, a smart eavesdropper might actively attack this channel
training phase by sending the same pilot sequences as the users
to cause pilot contamination at the transmitter. In this case, the
eavesdropping capability can be improved significantly [6].
The emergence of smart mobile devices such as smart
phones and wireless modems has led to an exponentially
increasing demand for wireless data services. A recent and
promising solution to meet this demand is massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) technology, which utilizes a
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very large number of antennas at the BS with simple signal
processing to serve a comparatively small (compared to the
number of antennas) number of users. The field of massive
MIMO communication systems was initiated by the pioneering
work in [7] which considered multi-cell multi-user TDD
communication. The key idea in [7] is that as the number of
transmit antennas increases, due to the law of large numbers,
the effects of uncorrelated receiver noise and fast fading
vanish. Then, the only residual interference is caused by the
reuse of the pilot sequences in other cells, which is known as
pilot contamination. Since the publication of [7], many aspects
of massive MIMO systems have been investigated [8–11].
Physical layer security for massive MIMO systems with
passive eavesdroppers and imperfect CSI has been recently
considered in [12]. Secure massive MIMO transmission for
multi-cell multi-user systems has been investigated in [13],
where a passive eavesdropper attempts to decode the infor-
mation sent to one of the users. It was assumed in [12,
13] that the channel gains of both the desired receiver and
the eavesdropper are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). The detection of the existence of an active eavesdropper
in massive MIMO systems was investigated in [14] for i.i.d.
fading channels. However, a systematic approach to combat
the pilot contamination attack from the active eavesdropper
and maintain secrecy of communication for general fading
channels was not provided in [14] and has not been studied
in the literature, yet.
In this paper, we study secure transmission for TDD multi-
cell multi-user massive MIMO systems in the presence of an
active eavesdropper over general fading channels. We assume
that in the uplink training phase, the active eavesdropper sends
the same pilot sequence as the desired receiver to impair the
channel estimation at the transmitter. Therefore, pilot contam-
ination occurs at the transmitter. Then, the transmitter uses
the estimated channel to compute the precoder for downlink
transmission.
This paper makes the following key contributions:
1) We derive a closed-form expression for the asymptotic
achievable secrecy rate with matched filter precoding
and AN generation at the transmitter assuming the
number of transmit antennas tends to infinity.
2) Based on the derived asymptotic expression, we obtain
the optimal power allocation policy for the information
signal and the AN in closed form. Moreover, for the
special case of point-to-point transmission over i.i.d.
fading channels [6], we prove that the power allocated
to the transmit signal should be less than a threshold in
order to ensure reliable secure transmission.
3) For the case of correlated fading channels, we reveal
that the impact of the active eavesdropper will vanish
when the signal space (i.e., the span of the channel
correlation matrix eigenvectors corresponding to non-
zero eigenvalues) of the users and the eavesdropper are
mutually orthogonal.
4) We exploit the low rank property of the transmit cor-
relation matrices of massive MIMO channels [9, 10] to
design an efficient precoding scheme that transmits in
the null space of the transmit correlation matrix of the
eavesdropper.
Notation: Vectors are denoted by lower-case bold-face let-
ters; matrices are denoted by upper-case bold-face letters.
Superscripts (·)T , (·)∗, and (·)H stand for the matrix transpose,
conjugate, and conjugate-transpose operations, respectively.
We use tr(A) and A−1 to denote the trace operation and the
inverse of matrix A, respectively. ‖ · ‖ and | · | denote the
Euclidean norm of a matrix/vector and a scalar, respectively.
diag {b} denotes a diagonal matrix. The main diagonal of
diag {b} contains the elements of vector b. vec (A) stacks
all columns of matrix A into a vector. The M ×M identity
matrix is denoted by IM , and the all-zero matrix is denoted
by 0. The field of complex numbers is denoted by C and
E [·] denotes statistical expectation. We use x ∼ CN (0N ,R)
to denote a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector
x ∈ CN×1 with zero mean and covariance matrix R. [x]+
stands for max {0, x}, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, and
A
N→∞
→ B means that A almost surely converges to B when
N goes to infinity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-cell multi-user system with L+1 cells.
Each cell contains a BS with Nt antennas and K single-
antenna users. Without loss of generality, let the reference cell
to be denoted by l = 0. An active eavesdropper with a single-
antenna1 is located in the reference cell, and seeks to recover
the private message destined to a specific target user m.
A. Uplink Training and Channel Estimation
In the uplink training and channel estimation phase, the
received signal y0 at the BS in the reference cell is given
by [9]
y0=
K∑
k=1
√
P0k (ω0k ⊗ INt)h00k+
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plk (ωlk ⊗ INt)h0lk
+
√
PE (ω0m ⊗ INt)h0E + n. (1)
Here, Plk and ωlk ∈ Cτ×1 are the average transmit power
and the pilot sequence of the kth user in the lth cell, where τ
denotes the length of the pilot sequence. hplk = (R
p
lk)
1/2
g
p
lk ∈
CNt×1 denotes the channel between the kth user in the lth
cell and the BS in the pth cell, where gplk ∼ CN (0Nt , INt)
and Rplk ∈ CNt×Nt is the correlation matrix of channel h
p
lk.
PE denotes the average transmit power of the eavesdropper.
hlE =
(
RlE
)1/2
glE denotes the channel between the eaves-
dropper and the BS in the lth cell, where glE ∼ CN (0Nt , INt)
and RlE ∈ CNt×Nt is the correlation matrix of channel
hlE . n ∈ C
τNt×1 is a zero-mean complex Gaussian noise
vector with covariance matrix N0IτNt . We assume that the
same K orthogonal pilot sequences are used for the K
users in each cell [7], i.e., ω0k = ω1k = · · ·ωLk = ωk,
ω
H
lkωlk = τ,ω
H
lkωlp = 0. Then, the minimum mean square
1In order to obtain some initial insights regarding massive MIMO systems
with active eavesdropping, we assume a single-antenna eavesdropper in
this paper. It is noted that even a single-antenna active eavesdropper is
an extremely harmful threat to secrecy transmission since it influences the
precoder used in downlink transmission [6, 14]. Considering the conclusion
in [15, Appendix B], we can also extend our analysis to multiple-antenna
eavesdroppers. However, the extension to multiple-antenna eavesdroppers
requires additional pilot sequence design at the eavesdropper and a modified
precoder design at the transmitter side, which will be investigated in the
journal version of this paper.
error (MMSE) estimate of h00m is given by [16]
ĥ
0
0m =
√
P0mR
0
0m
(
N0INt+τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtmR
0
tm+PER
0
E
))−1
y˜0m, (2)
where
y˜0m=
√
P0mτh
0
0m+
L∑
t=1
√
Ptmτh
0
tm+
√
PEτh
0
E+(ωm⊗INt)Hn.
(3)
Here, h00m = ĥ00m + e00m, where the estimated channel
ĥ00m ∼ CN
(
0Nt , R̂
0
0m
)
and the estimation error e00m ∼
CN
(
0Nt ,R
0
0m − R̂
0
0m
)
are mutually independent. The cor-
relation matrix R̂00m is given by
R̂
0
0m =
P0mτR
0
0m
(
N0INt+τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtmR
0
tm+PER
0
E
))−1
R
0
0m. (4)
Similarly, the MMSE channel estimates for the mth user
and the kth user, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, k 6= m, in the lth cell,
l = 0, 1, · · · , L, are given by
ĥ
l
lm =
√
PlmR
l
lm
(
N0INt+τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tm+PER
l
E
))−1
y˜lm (5)
y˜lm =
√
Plmτh
l
lm +
L∑
t=0,t 6=l
√
Ptmτh
l
tm
+
√
PEτh
l
E + (ωm ⊗ INt)Hn (6)
and
ĥ
l
lk =
√
PlkR
l
lk
(
N0INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
y˜lk (7)
y˜lk =
√
Plkτh
l
lk +
L∑
t=0,t 6=l
√
Ptmτh
l
tk + (ωk ⊗ INt)Hn, (8)
respectively. The correlation matrices of ĥllm and ĥllk are givenby
R̂
l
lm = PlmτR
l
lm
(
N0INt + τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tm + PER
l
E
))−1
R
l
lm
(9)
and
R̂
l
lk = PlkτR
l
lk
(
N0INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
R
l
lk, (10)
respectively.
Remark 1: We assume that the correlation matrices of
the users and the eavesdropper are perfectly known at the
transmitter, see (2), (5), (7). For massive MIMO systems, it is
reasonable to assume that the statistical CSI of the users of the
system is known at the BS [9]. Therefore, if the BS attempts
to transmit a private message to some users and treats other
users as eavesdroppers, i.e., the eavesdropper is an idle user of
the system, the correlation matrix of the eavesdropper can also
assumed to be known. In other cases, the assumption that the
correlation matrices of the active eavesdropper are available
at the transmitter may also be reasonable. For example, we
can obtain E
[
y˜lmy˜
H
lm
]
by averaging y˜lm over different data
slots. Eq. (6) suggests that E [y˜lmy˜Hlm] is the sum of the
correlation matrices of all users and the eavesdropper. Then,
PER
l
E can be obtained by subtracting the correlation matrices
of the legitimate users and the noise from E
[
y˜lmy˜
H
lm
]
.
B. Downlink Data Transmission
Next, we consider data transmission. We assume that the
BSs in all L+1 cells perform jamming to prevent eavesdrop-
ping in their own cell. Then, the transmit signal in the lth cell
l = 0, 1, · · · , L is given by
xl =
√
P
(
√
p
K∑
k=1
wlkslk +
√
qUnull, lzl
)
, (11)
where P is the average transmit power for downlink
transmission and slk is the transmit signal for the kth
user in the lth cell with E
[
|slk|
2
]
= 1. p and q represent
the power allocation between the transmit signal and the
AN with p + q = 1. Due to the high implementation
complexity of the matrix inversion required for zero forcing
and MMSE precoding, here we adopt the simple matched
filter precoding for massive MIMO systems [7, 8, 13]. Thus,
we set wlk =
ĥ
l
lk
‖ĥllk‖
for the kth user in the lth cell.
Unull, l and zl ∼ CN (0Nt , INt) denote the AN shaping
matrix and the AN vector in the lth cell, respectively.
We define Ĥll =
[
ĥll1, ĥ
l
l2, · · · , ĥ
l
lK
]
. To reduce the
implementation complexity when the number of antennas is
large, we fix the AN shaping matrix to be the asymptotic
null space of Ĥll. Based on [17, Corollary 1], we have
1
Nt
(
Ĥll
)H
Ĥll
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
diag
[
tr
(
R̂ll1
)
,tr
(
R̂ll2
)
,· · · ,tr
(
R̂llK
)]
.
Thus, we set Unull, l = INt −
Ĥlldiag
[
tr
(
R̂ll1
)
−1
, tr
(
R̂ll2
)
−1
, · · · , tr
(
R̂llK
)
−1
] (
Ĥll
)H
.
It can be shown that 1Nt tr
(
Unull, lU
H
null, l
)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
(Nt−K).
To ensure 1Ntx
H
l xl
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
P , we set Kp+(Nt−K)q = 1.
The received signal at the mth user in the reference cell,
y0m, and at the eavesdropper, yeve, are given by
y0m =
L∑
l=0
(
h
l
0m
)H
xl + n0m (12)
and
yeve =
L∑
l=0
(
h
l
E
)H
xl + neve, (13)
respectively. Here, n0m and neve are zero-mean Gaussian noise
processes with variance N0,d. We define the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) of the downlink transmission as γ = P/N0,d.
III. MATCHED FILTER PRECODING AND AN GENERATION
An achievable ergodic secrecy rate of massive MIMO
systems in Section II can be expressed as [13]
Rsec = [R0m − Ceve]+ (14)
where R0m and Ceve denote the achievable ergodic rate
between the BS and the mth user and the ergodic capacity
between the BS and the eavesdropper, in the 0th cell, respec-
tively. The achievable ergodic rate R0m is given by [13, Eq.(8)]
R0m = E [log2 (1 + SINR0m)] . (15)
where SINR0m is given by
SINR0m =
pγ
∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0m∣∣∣2
A
(16)
A=pγ
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
[∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0k∣∣∣2]+qγ [∣∣∣(h00m)HUnull, 0∣∣∣2]+pγ
×
L∑
l=1
[
K∑
k=1
[∣∣∣∣(hl0m)Hwlk∣∣∣∣2
]
+qγ
L∑
l=1
[∣∣∣∣(hl0m)HUnull, l∣∣∣∣2
]]
+1.
(17)
To capture the worst case, we assume that the eavesdropper
has perfect knowledge of its own channel and is able to decode
and cancel the signals of all intra-cell and inter-cell users from
the received signal yeve in (13) except for the signal intended
for the mth user in the 0th cell. In this case, Ceve can be
expressed as [13, Eq. (7)]
Ceve = E [log2 (1 + SINReve)] (18)
SINReve =
pγ
(
h0E
)H
w0mw
H
0mh
0
E
B
(19)
where
B=qγ
(
h
0
E
)
H
Unull, 0U
H
null, 0h
0
E+qγ
L∑
l=1
(
h
l
E
)
H
Unull, lU
H
null, lh
l
E+1.
(20)
Now, we are ready to provide an asymptotic achievable
secrecy rate expression when the number of antennas tends
to infinity, which is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: An asymptotic achievable secrecy rate for
matched filter precoding and AN generation for multi-cell
multi-user massive MIMO systems with an active eavesdrop-
per is given by
Rsec, asy
Nt→∞→ [log2 (1 + SINR0m, asy)
−log2 (1 + SINReve, asy)]+ , (21)
where
SINR0m, asy =
pγθm
pγθb,p + qγθb,q + 1
(22)
SINReve, asy =
pγθe,e
qγθe,q + 1
(23)
with
θm = tr
(
R̂
0
0m
)
+ tr
(
R̂
0
0m
)−1
tr
((
R
0
0m − R̂00m
)
R̂
0
0m
)
(24)
θb,p =
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1
tr
(
R
l
0mR̂
l
lk
)
+
L∑
l=1
tr
(
R̂
l
lm
)−1
Λl0m
(25)
θb,q =
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R
l
0m
)
−
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1
tr
(
R
l
0mR̂
l
lk
)
−
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R̂
l
lm
)−1
Λl0m (26)
Λl0m = τ
2P0m
∣∣∣tr(CllmRl0m)∣∣∣2 + τN0tr(Rl0mCllm(Cllm)H)
+ τ 2
L∑
t=1
Ptmtr
(
R
l
0mC
l
lmR
l
tm
(
C
l
lm
)H)
+ τ 2PEtr
(
R
l
0mC
l
lmR
l
E
(
C
l
lm
)H)
(27)
C
l
lm=
√
PlmR
l
lm
(
N0INt+τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm+PER
l
E
))−1
.
(28)
θe,e =
Λ0E
tr
(
R̂00m
) (29)
θe,q =
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R
l
E
)
−
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1
tr
(
R
l
ER̂
l
lk
)
−
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R̂
l
lm
)−1
ΛlE (30)
ΛlE = τ
2PE
∣∣∣tr(CllmRlE)∣∣∣2 + τN0tr(RlECllm(Cllm)H)
+ τ 2
L∑
t=0
Ptmtr
(
R
l
EC
l
lmR
l
tm
(
C
l
lm
)H)
. (31)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Based on Proposition 1, we can obtain several new insights
for massive MIMO systems with an active eavesdropper,
which are summarized in the following corollaries. The proofs
of these corollaries can be directly obtained by finding feasible
p which maximize Rsec, asy or yield Rsec, asy > 0 in (21).
Corollary 1: Let us define
p1 =
−(a1c2−a2c1)−
√
(a1c2−a2c1)2−(a1b2 − a2b1) (b1 − b2) c1
(a1b2 − a2b1) (32)
and
p2 =
−(a1c2−a2c1)+
√
(a1c2−a2c1)2−(a1b2 − a2b1) (b1 − b2) c1
(a1b2 − a2b1) (33)
where
a1 = −γ2 ((Nt −K) θm − (Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q)Kθe,q (34)
b1 = γ ((Nt −K) θm + (Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q)
× (γθe,q +Nt −K) + γ (γθb,q +Nt −K)
× ((Nt −K) θe,q −Kθe,q) (35)
c1 = (γθb,q +Nt −K) (γθe,q +Nt −K) (36)
a2 = γ
2 ((Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q) ((Nt −K) θe,e −Kθe,q) (37)
b2 = γ (γθb,q +Nt −K) ((Nt −K) θe,e −Kθe,q)
+ γ ((Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q) (γθe,q +Nt −K) (38)
c2 = (γθb,q +Nt −K) (γθe,q +Nt −K) . (39)
Then, the optimal power allocation p maximizing the
asymptotic achievable secrecy rate in (21) is given by
p∗ =

1, if p1 /∈ [0, 1] , p2 /∈ [0, 1] ,
arg max
p∈{1,p1}
Rsec, asy (p) , if p1 ∈ [0, 1] , p2 /∈ [0, 1] ,
arg max
p∈{1,p2}
Rsec, asy(p), if p1 /∈ [0, 1] , p2 ∈ [0, 1] ,
arg max
p∈{1,p1,p2}
Rsec, asy(p), if p1 ∈ [0, 1] , p2 ∈ [0, 1] .
(40)
Corollary 2: For Rsec, asy > 0, the power allocated to the
transmit signal must satisfy2:
p > − (b1−b2)(a1−a2) , if (a1 − a2) > 0;
p < − (b1−b2)(a1−a2) , if (a1 − a2) < 0.
For the special case of single-cell single-user communica-
tion (L = 0,K = 1,m = 1) with i.i.d. fading (R001 = βBINt
and R0E = βEINt , where βB and βE denote the path-loss for
the desired user and the eavesdropper, respectively. ) [6], we
have the following result.
Corollary 3: p < pth,1 has to hold in order to achieve
secure transmission in single-cell single-user communication
2When a1 − a2 = 0, if b1 − b2 > 0, then secure transmission can
be achieved for any p; otherwise, secure transmission can not be achieved
regardless of the value of p.
with i.i.d. fading, where
pth, 1 = 1 +
(N0 + τ (P01βB + PEβE))
(
P01β
2
B − PEβ2E
)
P01β2BγβE (N0 + τP01βB)
− PEβE (N0 + τPEβE)
P01βB (N0 + τP01βB)
. (41)
pth, 1 is a decreasing function of γ. In the high SNR regime,
when γ →∞,
pth, 1
γ→∞→ 1− PEβE (N0 + τPEβE)
P01βB (N0 + τP01βB)
. (42)
Remark 2: We note from (41) that for single-cell single-user
communication with i.i.d. fading, to enable secure transmis-
sion, the power allocated to the transmit signal has to decrease
with increasing SNR. In the high SNR regime, as shown in
(42), if the eavesdropper increases the average transmit power
PE in the uplink training phase to make pth, 1 < 0, secure
transmission cannot be achieved due to the pilot contamination
attack. In this case, increasing the average transmit power of
the desired user P01 in the uplink training phase is essential
to ensure secure transmission.
IV. NULL SPACE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
In the following proposition, we investigate the asymptotic
achievable secrecy rate under a special condition where the
transmit correlation matrices of the users are orthogonal to
the transmit correlation matrices of the eavesdropper.
Proposition 2: If
∑L
t=0 Ptmtr
(
RltmR
l
E
)
= 0 for l =
0, 1, · · · , L, then the secrecy rate Rsec, asy is equivalent to
the rate without the eavesdropper Rsec, asy, orth = log2(1 +
SINR0m, asy, orth), where
SINR0m, asy, orth =
pγθm,orth
pγθb,p,orth + qγθb,q,orth + 1
(43)
with
θm,orth = tr
(
R̂
0
0m,orth
)
+ tr
(
R̂
0
0m,orth
)−1
tr
((
R
0
0m − R̂00m,orth
)
R̂
0
0m,orth
)
(44)
θb,p,orth =
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1
tr
(
R
l
0mR̂
l
lk
)
+
L∑
l=1
tr
(
R̂
l
lm,orth
)−1
Λl0m,orth (45)
θb,q,orth =
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R
l
0m
)
−
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1
tr
(
R
l
0mR̂
l
lk
)
−
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R̂
l
lm,orth
)−1
Λl0m,orth (46)
Λl0m,orth = τ
2P0m
∣∣∣tr(Cllm,orthRl0m)∣∣∣2
+ τ 2
L∑
t=1
Ptmtr
(
R
l
0mC
l
lm,orthR
l
tm
(
C
l
lm,orth
)H)
+ τN0tr
(
R
l
0mC
l
lm,orth
(
C
l
lm,orth
)H)
(47)
C
l
lm,orth =
√
PlmR
l
lm
(
N0INt+τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm
)−1
(48)
R̂
l
lm,orth = PlmτR
l
lm
(
N0INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm
)−1
R
l
lm. (49)
Proof: The proposition can be proved by applying the ma-
trix inversion lemma in (4) and (9), using the fact R0EC00m =
0, and performing some matrix transformation operations. Due
to space limitation, details of the proof are omitted here.
Proposition 2 shows that when the channels of the eaves-
dropper and the users are statistically orthogonal, the impact of
the pilot contamination attack disappears. It is known that for
many massive MIMO scenarios, the transmit correlation ma-
trices of the channels are low rank [9, 10]. As a result, inspired
by Proposition 2, we propose a null space transmission design
along the correlation matrix of the eavesdropper’s channel h0E
as follows.
In the uplink training phase, we can rewrite (1) as
Y0 =
K∑
k=1
√
P0kh
0
0kω
T
k +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plkh
0
lkω
T
k +
√
PEh
0
Eω
T
m +N
(50)
where y0 = vec (Y0) and n = vec (N). Assume the rank
of R0E is N . Let us now construct a matrix V0E ∈ CNt×M ,
whose M columns are the M eigenvectors which correspond
to the zero eigenvalues of R0E , where M = Nt − N . In the
uplink training phase, we multiply Y0 with V0E to obtain(
V
0
E
)H
Y0 =
K∑
k=1
√
P0k
(
V
0
E
)H
h
0
0kω
T
k +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plk
× (V0E)H h0lkωTk +√PE (V0E)H h0EωTm + (V0E)H N (51)
and
y0,null = vec
((
V
0
E
)H
Y0
)
=
K∑
k=1
√
P0k (ωk ⊗ INt )h00k,null
+
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plk (ωk ⊗ INt)h0lk,null
+
√
PE (ωm ⊗ INt )
(
V
0
E
)H
h
0
E + n˜null (52)
where h0lk,null =
(
V0E
)H
h0lk ∼ CN
(
0,R0lk,null
)
, R0lk,null =(
V0E
)H
R0lkV
0
E , l = 0, 1, · · · , L, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , and
n˜null ∼ CN (0, τN0IM ). Then, we estimate h00m,null as
ĥ
0
0m,null =
√
P0mR
0
0m,null
(
N0IM + τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
0
tm,null
)−1
y˜0m,null, (53)
where
y˜0m,null =
√
P0mτh
0
0m,null +
L∑
t=1
√
Ptmτh
0
tm,null
+
√
PEτ
(
V
0
E
)H
h
0
E + (ωm ⊗ IM )Hn˜null. (54)
Similarly, we have h00m,null = ĥ00m,null + e00m,null,
where ĥ00m ∼ CN
(
0Nt , R̂
0
0m,null
)
and e00m,null ∼
CN
(
0Nt ,R
0
0m,null − R̂
0
0m,null
)
, with
R̂
0
0m,null =
P0mτR
0
0m,null
(
N0IM + τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
0
tm,null
)−1
R
0
0m,null. (55)
In the downlink data transmission phase, we employ the
same transmission scheme as in Section II-B, but replace w0m
with w0m,null = V0E
ĥ
0
0m,null
‖ĥ00m,null‖
, and set p = 1/K , q = 0.
We refer to this transmission design as “Null Space Design”.
Following the same approach as in Appendix A, we can show
that the asymptotic achievable secrecy rate of the “Null Space
Design” is still given by (21) after replacing R0m and R̂00m
with R0m,null and R̂00m,null in θm, respectively, and setting
R0E = 0 in (21). The other terms in (21) remain unchanged.
Remark 3: The proposed null space design transmits the
signal along the orthogonal subspace V0E . As a result, the
performance of the null space design depends on the rank
of V0E . For instance, for the extreme case of i.i.d. fading,
V0E does not exist and hence the null space design is not
applicable. In practice, the null space design will perform
better in highly correlated channels, under strong pilot con-
tamination attack, and in the high SNR regime since it can
effectively degrade the eavesdropper’s performance in these
scenarios. Matched filter precoding and AN generation, in
contrast, will perform better in weakly correlated channels,
under weak pilot contamination attack, and in the low SNR
regime. Based on the expression in (21), an analytical criterion
can be obtained to determine whether matched filter precoding
with AN generation or the null space design is preferable for
a given channel and eavesdropper parameters.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate
the secrecy performance of the considered massive MIMO
system with an active eavesdropper. We consider a system
where a Nt = 128 uniform linear array is employed at the
base station, the antenna spacing is half a wavelength, and
the angle of arrival (AoA) interval is A = [−pi/2, pi/2]. We
use the truncated Laplacian distribution to model the channel
power angle spectrum as [18]
p (θ) =
1√
2σ
(
1− e−√2pi/σ)e
−
√
2‖θ−θ‖
σ , (56)
where σ and θ denote the angular spread (AS) and the mean
AoA of the channel, respectively. We assume that the ASs σ
in (56) for the channels of all users and the eavesdropper are
identical and we set σ = pi/2. The channel covariance matrices
of all users and the eavesdropper are generated based on [18,
Eq. (3.14)]. For the channel between the user and the BS in its
own cell and the channel between the user and the BSs in the
other cells, we impose a channel power normalization to make
the trace of the channel covariance matrices equal to Nt and
ρNt, respectively, and set ρ = 0.1. The asymptotic secrecy
rate is computed from Proposition 1 and the exact secrecy
rate is obtained by Monte Carlo simulation. We set L = 3,
K = 5, Plk = 1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , l = 0, 1, · · · , L, τ = 10,
and N0 = 1. The mean channel AoAs θ of all users and the
eavesdropper in (56) are generated at random and the channel
AoAs θ of all users and the eavesdropper are distributed within
the angle interval [−pi, pi] based on (56).
Figure 1 shows the secrecy rate performance vs. the SNR γ
for matched filter precoding and AN generation and different
p. We observe from Figure 1 that the asymptotic secrecy rate in
Proposition 1 provides a good estimate for the exact secrecy
rate. Also, we observe from Figure 1 that in the low SNR
regime, allocating more power (larger p) to the transmit signal
leads to a higher secrecy rate. However, as the SNR increases,
the secrecy rate may be small if the transmit signal power is
high, i.e., if the AN power is small. For example, for SNR = 2
dB, we find from Corollary 2 that p < 0.15 is a necessary
condition to guarantee reliable communication. Thus, for p =
0.18, a positive secrecy rate cannot be achieved, as confirmed
by Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows the exact secrecy rate performance vs. the
SNR for different PE and different designs. For matched
filter precoding with AN generation, we obtain the optimal
power allocation p and q based on Corollary 1. For naive
matched filter precoding, we set p = 1/K and do not generate
AN. From Figure 2 we make the following observations:
1) Because of the pilot contamination attack, even if the
transmitter is equipped with a large number of antennas, naive
−20 −10 0 10 20 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
SNR (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
 (b
/s/
Hz
)
 
 
Exact Secrecy Rate for p = 0.04
Asymptotic Secrecy Rate for p = 0.04
Exact Secrecy Rate for p = 0.18
Asymptotic Secrecy Rate for p = 0.18
Fig. 1: Secrecy rate vs. the SNR for different p
−20 −10 0 10 20 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
SNR (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
 (b
/s/
Hz
)
 
 
Null Space Design (PE = 1)
Matched Filter Precoding with AN Generation (PE = 1)
Naive Matched Filter Precoding (PE = 1)
Null Space Design (PE = 5)
Matched Filter Precoding with AN Generation (PE = 5)
Naive Matched Filter Precoding (PE = 5)
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different precoding designs.
matched filter precoding can not achieve a positive secrecy
rate for moderate-to-high SNR. 2) For PE = 1, matched filter
precoding with AN generation performs better in the low-to-
moderate SNR regime and the null space design performs
better in the moderate-to-high SNR regime, see Remark 3.
3) When the eavesdropper increases the power of the pilot
contamination attack, this results in a serious secrecy rate
loss for matched filter precoding with AN generation, but has
barely any visible impact on the null space design. This is
because the null space design can eliminate the impact of pilot
contamination caused by the active eavesdropper as suggest by
(53) and significantly degrade the achievable rate of the active
eavesdropper.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the transmission design for
multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems in the presence
of an active eavesdropper. Assuming matched filter precoding
and AN generation, we obtained an asymptotic achievable
secrecy rate expression for the case of a pilot contamination
attack when the number of transmit antennas tends to infinity.
We obtained a closed-form expression for the optimal power
allocation policy for the transmit signal and the AN. Moreover,
we proved that the impact of the active eavesdropper is com-
pletely eliminated when the transmit correlation matrices of
the users and the eavesdropper are orthogonal. This motivates
the development of a null space design that exploits the low
rank property of the transmit correlation matrices of massive
MIMO channels. Monte Carlo simulation results showed that
the derived analytical results are accurate and confirmed
the effectiveness of the proposed transmission schemes for
combating the pilot contamination attack.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First, we calculate SINR0m in (16). For the numerator of(16), based on [17, Corollary 1], we have
1
Nt
[∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0m∣∣∣2]
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
∣∣∣ĥ00m∣∣∣2 + 1Nt

(
ĥ00m
)H (
R00m − R̂00m
)
ĥ00m∥∥∥ĥ00m∥∥∥2
 (57)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
tr
(
R̂
0
0m
)
+
1
Nt
tr
((
R00m − R̂00m
)
R̂00m
)
tr
(
R̂00m
) . (58)
For the denominator of (16), we have
1
Nt
∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0k∣∣∣2 =
(
h00m
)H
ĥ00k
(
ĥ00k
)H(
h00m
)
(
ĥ00k
)H
ĥ00k
(59)
Nt→∞→
(
ĥ00k
)H
R00mĥ
0
0k(
ĥ00k
)H
ĥ00k
(60)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
tr
(
R00mR̂
0
0k
)
tr
(
R̂00k
) . (61)
Also, performing some simplifications, we have
1
Nt
[∥∥∥(h00m)HUnull, 0∥∥∥2]Nt→∞→ 1NtR00m
− 1
Nt
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
0
0k
)−1(
h
0
0m
)H (
ĥ
0
0k
)(
ĥ
0
0k
)H
h
0
0m
− 1
Nt
tr
(
R̂
0
0m
)−1(
h
0
0m
)H (
ĥ
0
0m
)(
ĥ
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m. (62)
For m 6= k, h00m is independent of ĥ00k. Hence, the asymp-
totic expression for 1Nt
(
h00m
)H
ĥ00k
(
ĥ00k
)H
h00m is given by
the numerator of (61).
For m = k, based on (2), we have
ĥ
0
0m =
√
P0mτC
0
0mh
0
0m +C
0
0m
L∑
l=1
√
Plmτh
0
lm
+C00m
√
PEτh
0
E +C
0
0mΩmn, (63)
where C00m is defined in (48) and Ωm = (ωm ⊗ INt)H .
Based on (63), we obtain(
h
0
0m
)H
ĥ
0
0m
(
ĥ
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m =
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0mΩmn
(
ĥ
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+ τ 2
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0m
L∑
t=0
L∑
s=0
√
Ptm
√
Psmh
0
tm
(
h
0
sm
)H(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+ τ 2
√
PE
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0m
L∑
t=0
√
Ptmh
0
tm
(
h
0
E
)H(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+ τ
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0m
L∑
t=0
√
Ptmh
0
tmn
H
Ω
H
m
(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+ τ
√
PE
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0mh
l
E
(
ĥ
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m (64)
When Nt →∞, based on (64) and [17, Corollary 1], we have
1
Nt
(
h
0
0m
)H
ĥ
0
0m
(
ĥ
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
τ 2
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0m
L∑
t=0
Ptmh
0
tm
(
h
0
tm
)H(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+
1
Nt
τ 2PE
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0mh
0
E
(
h
0
E
)H(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+
1
Nt
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0mΩmn
(
C
0
0mΩmn
)H
h
0
0m
=
1
Nt
τ 2P0m
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0mh
0
0m
(
h
0
0m
)H(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+
1
Nt
τ 2
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0m
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Ptmh
0
tm
(
h
0
tm
)H(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+
1
Nt
τ 2PE
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0mh
0
E
(
h
0
E
)H(
C
0
0m
)H
h
0
0m
+
1
Nt
(
h
0
0m
)H
C
0
0mΩmn
(
C
0
0mΩmn
)H
h
0
0m
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
Λ00m. (65)
Also, for m 6= k, hl0m is independent of ĥllk , and we obtainin (17)
1
Nt
∣∣∣∣(hl0m)Hwlk∣∣∣∣2 = 1Nt
(
h
l
0m
)H ĥllk∣∣∣ĥllk∣∣∣
(
ĥllk
)H∣∣∣ĥllk∣∣∣ hl0m (66)
Nt→∞→
(
ĥllk
)H
Rl0mĥ
l
lk∣∣∣ĥllk∣∣∣2
Nt→∞→
tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
tr
(
R̂llk
) .
(67)
For m = k, similar to (65), we have
1
Nt
∣∣∣∣(hl0m)Hwlm∣∣∣∣2 = 1Nt
(
hl0m
)H
ĥllm
(
ĥllm
)H
hl0m∣∣∣ĥllm∣∣∣2 (68)
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
Λl0m
tr
(
R̂llm
) . (69)
Next, we simplify(
h
l
0m
)H
Unull, lU
H
null, lh
l
0m = tr
(
R
l
0m
)
−
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1(
h
l
0m
)H (
ĥ
l
lk
)(
ĥ
l
lk
)H
h
l
0m
− tr
(
R̂
l
lm
)−1(
h
l
0m
)H (
ĥ
l
lm
)(
ĥ
l
lm
)H
h
l
0m. (70)
Following a similar approach as was used to obtain (61)
and (65), we obtain
1
Nt
(
h
l
0m
)H (
ĥ
l
lk
)(
ĥ
l
lk
)H
h
l
0m
Nt→∞→ tr
(
R
l
0mR̂
l
lk
)
(71)
1
Nt
(
h
l
0m
)H (
ĥ
l
lm
)(
ĥ
l
lm
)H
h
l
0m
Nt→∞→ Λl0m. (72)
By substituting (57)–(72) into (16), we obtain the expression
for SINR0m, asy in (22). Next, we simplify SINReve in (19).
First, we consider(
h
0
E
)H
w0mw
H
0mh
0
E =
(
h0E
)H
ĥ00m
(
ĥ00m
)H
h0E∣∣∣ĥ00m∣∣∣2 . (73)
When Nt →∞, we have
1
Nt
(
h
0
E
)H
ĥ
0
0m
(
ĥ
0
0m
)H
h
0
E
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
Λ0E (74)
1
Nt
∣∣∣ĥ00m∣∣∣2 Nt→∞→ 1Nt tr
(
R̂
0
0m
)
. (75)
1
Nt
(
hlE
)H
Unull, lU
H
null, lh
l
E can be expressed as
1
Nt
(
h
l
E
)H
Unull, lU
H
null, lh
l
E
=
1
Nt
tr
(
R
l
E
)
−
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1 1
Nt
(
h
l
E
)H(
ĥ
l
lk
)(
ĥ
l
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)H
h
l
E
− tr
(
R̂
l
lk
)−1 1
Nt
(
h
l
E
)H (
ĥ
l
lm
)(
ĥ
l
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)H
h
l
E . (76)
The asymptotic expressions for 1Nt
(
hlE
)H (
ĥllk
)(
ĥllk
)H
hlE
and 1Nt
(
hlE
)H (
ĥllm
)(
ĥllm
)H
hlE in (76) are given by
1
Nt
(
h
l
E
)H
ĥ
l
lk
(
ĥ
l
lk
)H
h
l
E
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
tr
(
R
l
ER̂
l
lk
)
(77)
and
1
Nt
(
h
l
E
)H
ĥ
l
lm
(
ĥ
l
lm
)H
h
l
E
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
ΛlE , (78)
respectively.
Substituting (73)–(78) into (19), we obtain (23), which
completes the proof.
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